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ANTITRUST LAW
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION THWARTING CONGLOMERATE

MERGER DENIED

Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act' makes unlawful those corporate acquisitions which may have substantial anticompetitive consequences.
By employing the word "may," Congress indicated that its concern
was with "probabilities, not certainties." 2 Thus, in determining the
legality of a particular merger, a court will consider the "reasonable
likelihood ' 3 of a lessening of competition. In the case of a conglomerate
merger, however, the determination of legality may be especially difficult since the effects of the merger on competition are often not as
readily identifiable as those accompanying the more traditional horizontal and vertical mergers. 4 Nevertheless, conglomerate mergers are
subject to the same anticompetitive prohibitions embodied in section 7.
In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,Inc.,5 the Second Circuit considered the propriety of a district court order preliminarily
enjoining the continuation of a tender offer which threatened to result
in the effectuation of an unlawful conglomerate merger. Reversing the
district court's determination, the court concluded that the target
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7, in part, provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
2 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
3United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
4 A conglomerate merger consists of any acquisition other than a horizontal or vertical
merger. A horizontal merger occurs between two companies that are direct competitors of
each other. A vertical merger is one where the acquired firm is, or might easily become,
a customer or a supplier of the acquiring firm. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomms. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Part 2, Mergers and Other Factors Affecting Industry Concentration, Pursuant to S. Res.
40, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 515-20 (1965).
Conglomerate mergers can be divided into three broad subcategories: product-extension mergers, geographic market-extension mergers, and pure conglomerate mergers. A
product-extension merger involves a merger of companies which use a common distribution system for products which do not directly compete with one another. A geographic
market-extension merger occurs between companies which manufacture the same products
but distribute them in different geographic markets. Id. Mr. Justice Douglas has defined a
pure conglomerate merger as one where "there are no economic relationships between"
the two companies involved in the merger. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
577 n.2 (1967).
5498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 150 (1974).
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of the merger plan, Missouri Portland Cement Co., had failed to
establish the probability that its acquisition by Cargill might have
substantial anticompetitive effects.6 By so holding, the court may have
introduced a new permissiveness with respect to the validity of conglomerate mergers.
In 1973, Cargill, a large diversified corporation engaged in grain
trading and other bulk commodity businesses,7 announced an offer to
purchase all outstanding shares of Missouri Portland (MP), a publicly
held corporation manufacturing portland cement and selling it in an
area encompassing eleven states.8 Upon acquiring control of MP
through the tender offer, Cargill intended either to merge it into the
parent organization, or to operate it as a subsidiary. 9 In either event,
due to the unrelated nature of the companies involved, the proposed
acquisition would constitute a pure conglomerate merger. 10 The management of MP resisted Cargill's takeover attempt in the district court
on the grounds that both the antitrust and securities laws had been
violated. The court found no improprieties in Cargill's tender offer
under the securities laws," but held that the contemplated merger
raised "substantial and difficult antitrust questions"' 2 justifying the
6 Id. at 866. The case was remanded to the district court for the framing of a temporary injunction to allow the tender offer to continue pending litigation on the merits.
Id. at 875.
7 Cargill's bulk commodities included such items as sugar, ores and metals, fertilizers,
industrial chemicals, poultry products, and salt. Id. at 856.
8 Cargill originally contended that the eleven-state area in which MP sold its product
was the correct geographic market. The district court, however, found that the acquisition
would foreclose competition in four metropolitan markets: St. Louis and Kansas City,
Missouri; Memphis, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska. Id. at 856.
Although for purposes of the appeal Cargill assumed arguendo the correctness of the
district court's definition of submarkets, this interpretation may have been faulty. For
example, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974), the
Supreme Court stated that
for purposes of § 7 "section of the country" means "relevant geographic market"
and the latter concept means the area in which the relevant product is in fact
marketed by the acquired firm.
Id. at 2870 n.20. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, in United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426
F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1970), affirmed the findings of the FTC that the relevant geographic
markets for the sale of portland cement in that case were the northeastern United States
and the New York metropolitan area.
9498 F.2d at 855.
10 See note 4 supra. Although MP contended that the proper classification was a
product-extension merger, Judge Friendly disagreed. He pointed to FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), as an example of a true product-extension merger. There,
Procter 8- Gamble, a producer of detergents, proposed to acquire Clorox, a manufacturer
of bleach. The products were closely related and the competitive advantages were obvious.
On the other hand, "the relationship between Cargill's bulk commodities business and
the cement industry bears only the most superficial resemblance to the product affinity
between Procter and Clorox." 498 F 2d at 859.
11 See text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
12 498 F.2d at 855.
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granting of preliminary injunctive relief. 13 On appeal from the order,
Judge Friendly, writing for a unanimous panel, 14 applied the Second
Circuit's established standard for determining whether a preliminary
injunction is warranted. 15 He first conducted an inquiry into the merits
of MP's antitrust allegations, 16 followed by a consideration of the equi17
ties favoring the respective parties.
With respect to the merits of its action, MP asserted two antitrust
theories, potential competition and entrenchment, as barring its acquisition by Cargill.' 8 The potential competition doctrine provides that
an acquisition may result in an antitrust violation if it eliminates potential, as opposed to actual, competition between the merging compa20
nies. 19 Thus, for example, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,
the Supreme Court indicated that the joint venture2' being challenged
Is Id. Section

16 of the Clayton Act provides:

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws...

when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity,
under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper
bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that
the danger of irreparable loss or damages is immediate, a preliminary injunction

may issue ....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
14 The panel consisted of Judges Friendly, Waterman, and Mulligan.
15 Within the Second Circuit, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate
either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
Sonesta Intl Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
16 498 F.2d at 860.
17 Id. at 866.
IsId. at 860.
19 See Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of
the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 1231, 1241 (1968). The concern is that the acquisition might foreclose the possibility that the acquiring firm would become an additional
competitor in the relevant market.
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974), the Supreme

Court stated:
The potential competition doctrine has meaning only as applied to concentrated
markets. That is, the doctrine comes into play only where there are dominant
participants in the target market engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior
and with the capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods
or services.
Id. at 2874. The concentrated market theory is dearly applicable to the portland cement
industry. In three of the four submarkets, three companies had interests of 20% or more
and in the fourth market, 62% was controlled by one company with MP, its closest
competitor, controlling 21%0. 498 F.2d at 856.
20 378 U.S. 158 (1964), complaint dismissed on remand, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (per curiam).
21 Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson, both of which produced sodium chlorate, had
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therein by the Government might constitute an antitrust violation if
it resulted in removing a corporation from the "edge of the market,"
where it had been "continuously threatening to enter. 2' 2 Applying this
reasoning to the instant case, the Second Circuit rejected MP's contentions, finding no evidence to suggest that Cargill might have made a
de novo entry into the cement industry in the event that it failed to
acquire Missouri Portland. 24 The court noted that Cargill had no permanent commitment to the cement industry.2 5 Furthermore, Cargill's
brief investigation of the industry was insufficient to establish the
"incentive to compete" requisite for a finding of potential competition.26
The absence of an actual probability of de novo entry, however,
is not wholly dispositive of the potential competition theory. A company
which, in fact, has no plans to make a de novo entry into the relevant
market may still be feared as a potential entrant by those already within
the market. This concept was articulated in United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.,27 wherein the Supreme Court remanded the case for
formed a joint venture to market that chemical in the southeastern United States. The
Supreme Court stated that essentially the same considerations apply to mergers as to joint
ventures in a case involving a possible violation of § 7. 378 U.S. at 170.
22Id. at 173. In Penn-Olin, the district court had reasoned that since the two companies would not both have entered the market independently, the potential competition
theory was unavailable. The Supreme Court, however, found that entrance by only one
of the companies would be sufficient to indicate that the proposed joint venture would
violate § 7, stating:
There still remained for consideration the fact that Penn-Olin eliminated the
potential competition of the corporation that might have remained at the edge
of the market, continually threatening to enter. Just as a merger eliminates actual
competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect of competition
between Olin and Pennsalt in the relevant sodium chlorate market.
Id.
23 In recently approving a market-extension merger of two banks, the Supreme Court
enunciated two essential preconditions which must exist in order to apply that aspect of
the potential competition doctrine concerned with the possibility of de novo entry or
toehold acquisitions. First, the acquiring company must possess "feasible means" for entering the relevant market by means other than the acquisition in question. Secondly,
those alternate means must "offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive effects." United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2875 (1974). The significance of the Court's
approval of the merger in Marine Bancorporationis highlighted by Justice White's criticism that the Court "dramatically escalate[d] the burden of proving that a merger 'may
substantially lessen competition' within the meaning of § 7." Id. at 2881.
24 The Second Circuit found that it would cost Cargill up to $200,000,000 to construct
its own cement facilities comparable to those of MP, whereas Cargill hoped to acquire
the latter through the cash tender offer for approximately $45,000,000. 498 F.2d at 864.
It was even conceded by counsel for MP that Cargill could not enter the relevant markets
de novo. Id. at 864 n.26.
25 Id. at 861.
26 Id.
27410 U.S. 526 (1973). Falstaff, the only major beer producer in the country which
did not sell in New England, acquired Narragansett Brewing Company, the largest beer
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consideration of whether the acquiring company might be a potential
competitor "in the sense that it was so positioned on the edge of the
market that it exerted beneficial influence on competitive conditions
in that market." 28 In Missouri Portland, however, the Second Circuit
was unable to conclude that any company in the cement industry would
ever regard Cargill as a potential future entrant if its present entry
attempt were stymied. 29 Distinguishing Falstaff, the court reasoned that
the district court's error lay in identifying, for purposes of potential competition, a company making the same commodity... or
a closely related one sold to the same purchasers by the same
means.. . with a diversifying company that had never before been
regarded as a potential entrant and was not likely to remain one
if its rational choice of a method of entry was barred. 30
As a final reference to the potential competition argument, Judge
Friendly considered whether Cargill might possibly have entered the
market by means of "toehold" acquisitions.8 1 If such were the case,
Cargill's acquisition of Missouri Portland might have had anticompetitive effects by preempting Cargill's acquisition and expansion of smaller
cement companies.8 2 The court noted, however, that the cement plants
cited by the district court as potential toehold prospects were not likely
to be acquired by Cargill.s Either they already had substantial shares
of the relevant markets, or were too far from the relevant geographic
company in the New England market. There was evidence that Falstaff's management
had consistently decided against de novo entry into the New England market.
28 Id. at 532-33. Professor Turner has indicated three minimum conditions that must
be met before a company "at the edge" of the market will be considered a significant
competitive influence:
1. The market concerned must be an oligopoly market: the number of actual
sellers must be sufficiently small for them to be able collectively, though not necessarily collusively, to maintain prices above competitive levels.
2. The merging firm at the edge of the market must be recognized by those in
the market as the most likely entrant or one of a very few likely entrants, with
barriers to entry by new companies or by other established firms being significantly
higher.
3. The barrier to entry by the firm in question must not be so high that the
price it must expect to obtain before it would come in is above the price that
would maximize the profits of the existing sellers.
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAv. L. REv. 1313,
1362-63 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
29 498 F.2d at 863.
80 Id.
81 A toehold acquisition occurs when a company acquires and expands a small firm
with the intention of competing in a new market. Note, Toehold Acquisitions and the
PotentialCompetition Doctrine,40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 156, 157 (1972).
82 The FTC has sanctioned the use of toehold acquisitions since they "may be as
economically desirable and beneficial to competition as internal expansion into a relevant
market.
...
Bendix Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,288, at
21,445 (FTC 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d at 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
8 498 F.2d at 864.
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4
markets involved to create a likely probability of competition therein.,
Additionally, some of the cement plants were simply considered poor
prospects for future development. 5
The court next examined the "deep pocket" or "entrenchment"
theory asserted by Missouri Portland. The entrenchment theory is
founded on the probability that an oligopolist with extraordinary resources will be in a financial position to keep prices at a level just below
that which would encourage others to enter the market 2 6 MP argued
that because of Cargill's tremendous resources, the acquisition would
either raise entry barriers 7 to other potential entrants or discourage
competition from smaller cement competitors who would fear some
form of retaliation by the large acquiring firm. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that "mere recitation of the 'deep pocket' shibboleth was
not enough." 38 Many of the cement companies in the relevant markets
were controlled by large corporations, including such giants as U.S.
Steel and Martin-Marietta, who did not "seem likely to cower before
34 Id.

sr Id.

86 See Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667,
1671 (1967). In FrC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), the Supreme Court
suggested how entrenchment could have substantial anticompetitive effects:
Mhe substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but already
dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively
competing ....
Id. at 578.
87 Professor Backman has enumerated the following barriers to entry: capital require-

ments, technological requirements, control of scarce resources, transportation costs, product differentiation, patents, tariff and non-tariff barriers, and scarce technical personnel.
Backman, Conglomerate Mergers and Competition, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuIsITIONs; OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 90, 103-04 (spec. ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Backman].
The way in which entry barriers can arise has been explained in general terms as
follows:
Barriers to entry might be raised by any change in market conditions that makes
entry less attractive, including an association of an existing competitor with a
large corporation that gives the existing competitor the apparent ability, either
because of economies or large resources, to outcompete new entrants by underpricing them or engaging in heavy advertising.
B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE AcQuIsITIONS AND MERGERS § 6.03, at 6-8 (1974). In testimony
before the FTC, Professor Garoian indicated that entry barriers can be measured in terms
of how much a firm in a given market can raise the price of its product above a competitive level without inducing an outside firm to enter the market. Scanlon, Economics
in the Courtroom: The 'Technology' of Antitrust Litigation, 3 ANrrrusr LAw & ECON.
Rnv. 1, 58 (1969) (quoting Professor Garoian).
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), the Supreme Court found that
the acquisition by Procter, the nation's leading advertiser, of Clorox would tend to raise
entry barriers to potential entrants. Procter's extensive use of advertising would make a
new entrant "more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the
smaller Clorox." Id. at 579.
88 498 F.2d at 866 n.32.
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Cargill." 39 Furthermore, Missouri Portland had not shown specifically
how Cargill's size alone would deter other potential entrants. °
Having resolved that MP had failed to establish a probability of
success on the merits, Judge Friendly considered whether the hardships
complained of by MP outweighed those which would accrue to Cargill
if the preliminary injunction were upheld. He noted initially that MP
had not demonstrated the "loss or damage" 41 which is required for an
injunction to obtain. Indeed, MP's assertion of the entrenchment theory
implied that MP would become stronger, not weaker, as a consequence
of the acquisition. 42 The district court had nevertheless determined
that MP would be harmed in several ways if Cargill's tender offer were
permitted to proceed. First, there would be a disruption of employee
morale during the takeover period prior to a trial on the antitrust issue.
Second, long-range development would be impaired. Third, should
the acquisition be found to create an antitrust violation, there would
be substantial problems caused by Cargill divesting itself of Missouri
Portland's shares and "unscrambling" the assets of the merged com43
panies.
The Second Circuit, however, once again determined that the
district court's conclusions were not adequately supported by the
evidence. 44 The argument concerning the effect on employee morale
had little merit in that a basic reason for Cargill's desire to enter the
cement industry by acquiring MP, rather than by de novo entry, was
its own lack of expertise. 45 There was no suggestion that Cargill was
planning to replace the target's key personnel with its own people. 46
With regard to the impairment of long-range development plans, Cargill had apparently concurred with MP's plans for expansion, and
there was nothing in the record to indicate how these plans would be
39 Id. at 865.
40 The fact that the acquiring firm is large does not necessarily mean that

§ 7 will
be violated. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In
Reynolds, while finding a § 7 violation, the court specifically disagreed with the Commission's contention that "the mere intrusion of 'bigness' into a competitive economic
community otherwise populated by commercial 'pygmies' will per se invoke the Clayton
Act." Id. at 230, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962). The
court went on to intimate that, despite the "bigness" of the parties concerned, an acquisition, in certain economic situations, might be "necessary to preserve competition ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
41 Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). See note 13 supra.
42 498 F.2d at 867.
43 Id. at 869.
44 Id.
45 Id.

46 See Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d Cir.
1973), where the problem of employee morale was deemed to be significant since there
were explicit indications on the part of Gulf and Western that key executives of A&P
would be replaced if the tender offer were successful.
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impaired by Cargill's takeover. 47 Finally, if divestiture became necessary, there did not appear to be any foreseeable difficulties in Cargill
divesting itself of its shares of MP.48 Such divestiture could be completed
without causing serious harm to the latter. Moreover, the problem of
unscrambling the assets could be avoided by a temporary injunction
against the assets being "scrambled" in the first place.49 Finally, in
concluding that the "balance of hardships" did not tip in favor of MP,
the Second Circuit added that the district court, while exaggerating the
potential hardship to MP, had minimized the hardship that Cargill
was likely to suffer if its tender offer were defeated. 0°
Turning to the securities law questions, the court of appeals rejected MP's allegations that Cargill had violated sections 14(d) and (e)
of the Williams Act.51 MP charged that, in announcing its tender offer,
Cargill did not sufficiently reveal its future plans regarding MP, and
also did not disclose the possibility that the acquisition could violate
the antitrust laws. 52 Finding no evidence that Cargill had finalized any
future plans for MP, the court relied upon the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.0 3 that an offeror
"is not required to make predictions of future behavior, however tentatively phrased, which may cause the offeree or the public investor to
rely on them unjustifiably.""4 With regard to the alleged failure to
disclose a possible antitrust violation, the Second Circuit concurred in
the district court's ruling that
the possibility that the acquisition would result in antitrust viola47 498 F.2d at 869.
48 Id.
49 Id. In FTC v. PepsiCo., Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit ap-

proved an alternative remedy for dealing with the "scrambling" of assets. It concluded
therein that a hold-separate agreement could be entered into by the parties in lieu of
the preliminary injunction. Id. at 31. If the district court had directed the issuance of a
hold-separate order in the instant case, this would have allowed Cargill's tender offer to
proceed. However, it would have required that MP's assets be held in a separate corporation, pending the outcome of the litigation of the antitrust issue.
GO 498 F.2d at 869-70. It has been observed that although the grant of a preliminary
injunction may only temporarily delay the offer, the effect of this delay may, in fact, be
sufficient to cause the eventual failure of the offer. E. ARANoW & H. EINHoRN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 266 (1973). Accordingly, Cargill listed several adverse
consequences it would suffer because of the preliminary injunction. These can be summarized as follows: (I) A suspension of the tender offer for the long duration of the trial
would be tantamount to a final judgment due to uncertainties of future market conditions.
(2) Cargill would stand to lose the substantial funds it had expended for the promotion
of the tender offer. (3) Unsophisticated stockholders might equate a preliminary injunction with an adjudication of guilt and consequently be unmvilling to tender their shares
even in the event of complete vindication of Cargill on the merits. Brief for Appellant
at 77-78.
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (e) (1970).
52498 F.2d at 871.
53423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
51 Id. at 1086.
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tions, a possibility that exists with every merger, need not have
been disclosed to Missouri Portland's shareholders.5
As previously noted, the Second Circuit's decision in Missouri
Portlandmight be interpreted as the reflection of a permissive attitude
toward conglomerate mergers. In the past, various authors have expressed the view that the potential competition and entrenchment
theories have received undeserved attention as rationales for discouraging conglomerate mergers. It has been argued that the potential competition theory is based on the unrealistic assumption that any large
company is a potential entrant into most markets.50 The entrenchment
theory has been attacked on the grounds that it is not supported
by concrete evidence 57 and ignores significant economies attainable
through conglomerate mergers which are actually procompetitive in
effect.58 The Missouri Portland court's refusal to uphold the prelim55498 F.2d at 872 n.44 (emphasis added).
In its answer, Cargill likewise counterclaimed for injunctive relief on the basis of
several alleged violations by MP of the securities laws. The Second Circuit held in favor
of Cargill on one of its allegations, finding that both an advertisement and letter addressed by MP to its stockholders were seriously misleading in contravention of § 14(e)
of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). 498 F.2d at 874-75.
MP had made the following statement to its shareholders:
This is Cargill's first bid. Cargill has indicated that it would like to acquire all
of Missouri Portland's outstanding Common Stock. If Cargill does not get all of
the Missouri Portland stock it seeks, you should ask yourself whether Cargill is
likely to buy additional shares at a price higher than $30 per share--either in
the open market or by raising its tender price. Cargill has reserved the right to
do just this in its tender offer.
Id. at 874. This statement was found to be misleading since it implied that an increase in price during the offer might not inure to the benefit of those shareholders who
had already tendered their shares to Cargill. Section 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970), requires that any increase in the terms of the offer must be
given to all shareholders who tendered their shares prior to the increase. Cargill's offer
indicated that this provision would be complied with in the event that an increase in
the offering price was made. 498 F.2d at 874.
Although finding in favor of Cargill, Judge Friendly ruled that the district court's
remedy, which required MP to submit all future communications to stockholders to the
district court for approval before releasing them, was too severe. Id. at 875. He found it
more appropriate simply to issue an injunction against warnings to shareholders of the
type that was found to be misleading. Id.
56 See Backman, supra note 37, at 110.
57 See Turner, supra note 28, at 1357. Professor Turner states:

where is no reason to anticipate that a change in the character of the firms, if
unaccompanied by a significant decline in the number of sellers, would produce
a less competitive situation than previously existed. Indeed, if economies of scale
are involved, it is highly probable that competitive performance will be improved.
Id. (emphasis in original).
55 Disagreement among economists as to the entrenchment theory's competitive importance "underscore[s] the unreality of positing automatic anticompetitive consequences
to the [entrenchment] potential of conglomerates." Jones & Haiden, Conglomerates: The
Need for Rational Policy Making, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrIONS: OPINION &
ANAr.YssS, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 243, 249 (spec. ed. 1970). The authors point out that there
is a lack of
convincing market evidence that, once into an industry, conglomerates have used
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inary injunction may very well signify the Second Circuit's disenchantment with the potential competition and entrenchment theories.0 9
It is apparent that the views expressed in Missouri Portland have
not met with complete approval. Despite the Second Circuit's decision, the Federal Trade Commission has announced the potential
competition theory as the basis upon which it intends to proceed
against Cargill's acquisition of MP. 60 In its complaint, 1 the FTC
noted that Cargill had important resources readily adaptable to
the cement industry. In addition to grain elevators which could be
adapted for use as storage facilities for cement, Cargill owned barges
and ships which could be easily modified for the transportation of
cement. The complaint thus hints at factors considered important by
the Tenth Circuit in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,62 wherein it
enjoined the acquisition of the Peabody Coal Company, the largest coal
producer in the United States, by Kennecott, the country's largest
copper producer. The Kennecott case was relied upon by MP, but the
Second Circuit, while stating that it could not determine its significance
without an opportunity for more extensive study, seemed to doubt the
propriety of the decision. 3
Mr. Justice Douglas, who unsuccessfully attempted to stay the
Second Circuit's decision, felt that the Missouri Portlandcase contained
facts "strikingly similar" to those in Kennecott.4 He noted that the
similarity existed "as regards the lack of related products but the
presence of related skills." 65 Nevertheless, it can be argued that the
[the opportunity for entrenchment] anticompetitively in order to increase their
market share, obtain further concentration, raise entry barriers, or hasten exit
through intimidation of actual and potential competitors.
rd. at 250 n.17.
59 At the outset of the opinion, Judge Friendly makes the following observation:
Where, as here, the acquisition would be neither horizontal nor vertical, there
are "strong reasons for not making the prohibitions of section 7 so extensive as
to damage seriously the market for capital assets, or so broad as to interfere materially with mergers that are procompetitive in their facilitation of entry and
expansion that would otherwise be subject to serious handicaps."

498 F.2d at 854, quoting Turner, supra note 28, at 1318. Professor Turner further comments:
Since the conglomerate acquisition, unlike the horizontal, does not remove an
existing competitor, it seems less likely that the benefits of reduced competition

are either a purpose or an effect of the transaction; consequently, it is more likely
that the purpose and effect of the entry by acquisition is to take advantage of
unrealized opportunities, such as economies, and is thus procompetitive.

Turner, supra note 28, at 1354.
60Cargill, Inc., 3 TRADE PG.REP. 20,745, at 20,599 (FTC 1974).
61 Cargill, Inc., No. 9005 (F.T.C. Jan. 21, 1975).
02467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
03498 F.2d at 860 n.14.
04 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 8210 (1974) (mem.) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from the granting of the motion to vacate the stay of mandate previously

entered by Justice Douglas).
65 Id. at 5212.
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cases are distinguishable in a number of respects. Kennecott, prior to
its acquisition of Peabody Coal, had acquired another coal company
and had manifested an interest in entering the coal business on a national scale.6 6 Moreover, Kennecott already had highly developed skills
and long experience in mining.6 7 Additionally, there could be observed
the elements of a vertical merger since Kennecott was a substantial
user of coal. 8 While Kennecott might be seen as "the most likely
entrant into the coal business," 69 Cargill was much less likely to be
considered a potential entrant into the cement industry. Prior to its
attempt to acquire MP, Cargill had never displayed any intent to enter
the market. Furthermore, while Cargill had the vast resources common
to many conglomerates, it had no skills peculiar to the needs of a cement
70

producer.

In any event, MissouriPortlandrepresents an expression of judicial
skepticism of the use of antitrust laws by target companies seeking
preliminary injunctive relief to defeat takeover attempts. 71 More significantly, the Second Circuit may have utilized this opportunity to
present its tacit approval of the conglomerate merger as a means of
encouraging competition. 72 However, since the issue was presented in
the context of a request for preliminary injunction, it may be unwise
to rely upon Missouri Portland as evidencing the position the Second
Circuit would adopt if the question were raised in a different procedural
setting.
Robert A. Stern
66 467 F.2d at 76.
67 Id. at 77.
68 Id. at 76.
69 Id. at 79.
70 Significantly, a 1966 FTC staff study identified fuel suppliers and cement consumers
as the most likely entrants into the cement industry. FTC, ECONOMiC REPORT ON MERGERS
AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY 88 (1966), quoted in Brief for Appellant at 38.
71 The skeptical tone of the court's opinion is established at the outset:
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained
sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to
obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the
offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it
persists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail
even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust
violation has been shown.
498 F.2d at 854. Judge Friendly has noted in the past that federal courts frequently become battlefields for target corporations seeking to block outsiders' takeover attempts. In
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), he
warned that district courts must be "vigilant against resort to the courts on trumped-up
or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and thereby defeating legitimate tender offers."
Id. at 947.
72498 F.2d at 854. See note 59 supra.

